THE PROGRAMMATIC PROPOSALS:
FURTHER ELABORATION
(Herui T. Bairu)
THE PROGRAMMATIC
PROPOSALS:
FURTHER ELABORATIONA. 'Adi Eritrea' VS 'Hadas Eritra'
B. Some Aspects of the Constitution
C. The Programmatic Proposals and the PDFJ
D. Some Electoral and Technical aspectsADI ERITRA VS HADAS ERITRA
The Adi/Ad is a unique social organisation. The Eritrean Adi shares all the characteristics of an ordinary African village community; and yet, it differs from it in the following way:
A. The Adi is a defined territorial unit.
B. The land of the Adi was the private property of its inhabitants and not the king or the feudal lord.
C . The inhabitants of the Adi had the rights of free citizens; they were not serfs of the feudal lord nor did the law require them to fight his wars as levies.
D . The Adi is not an ethnic but rather a territorial entity, accommodating families of several ethnic origins.The unconstitutional land and housing policies of the PFDJ has rendered the Adi a threatened institutional species. The Adis of Eritrea were legally organised as chartered communities by customary laws, which differed in specifics, but whose overriding goal was to protect the individual and the community from the powers of the king and the feudal lord. The Adi social organisation was so strong that even the usually insensitive Italian colonial administration accorded it an underhand recognition. After the Italian war in Libya was concluded with the help of 'Askaris', the Eritreans vanished into their respective Adis; the colonial administration, hard pressed to settle the non-Eritrean Askaris, allocated an area (in Asmara) for them which it named 'Hadish Adi'.
The inhabitants of Asmara, many of whom were the offspring of the 'askaris', coined the term 'Asmarino' to differentiate them from the inhabitants of Adi peasants. The adjective Asmarino gathered around itself a great deal of arrogance in relation to the inhabitants of the Adis and other Eritrean cities. Maybe the time has come to fold up the career of the appellation Asmarino and enhance that of the Adi. The Baito (Adi parliament) regulated the daily life of the Adi at the conflict and resolution levels. All the outlined aspects of the Adi, such as, citizenship, private property, legal and democratic traditions, make it the appropriate foundation of Eritrean democracy.
Another unconstitutional step that was taken by the PFDJ was the reorganisation of the provinces on the flimsy arguments that they were too many to permit efficient administration or that they were centres of regionalism. Whatever the justification of the drastic steps taken by the PFDJ, the fact remains that the deliberate eradication of traditional institutions as reactionary, may have weakened Eritrean nationalism. To be sure, the provinces may need to be reorganised; in that case, the projected national parliament is the only competent body mandated to attend to the matter.
For the Adi to be a primary building block in the construction of Eritrean democracy, the unconstitutional PFDJ land policy needs to be debated in the national parliament of independents. The first question that has to be resolved is whether the formulation that 'land belongs to the government' is another way of legitimising collective property ownership behind the back of the people. There are other equally important questions regarding land policy that need to be taken up at the appropriate time.
In order to attract the best candidates to the Adi and provincial parliaments, the salaries, transport facilities, and living standards of these countryside communities must be at a par with the city life. If this goal is fulfilled it is certain that many dedicated diaspora Eritreans, of working and pension ages, would return to partake in the development of their Adis. Building democracy from the Adi base upwards must replace, the paternalistic ('te'asasafinet' or 'flexibility') political line of the single party state.
SOME ASPECTS OF THE ERITREAN CONSTITUTION:
There is a simple litmus test for establishing the difference between a political organisation and a political party: all political parties are political organisations, but not all political organisations are political parties. Despite the fact that I was not a member of the commission of the constitution, and was excluded from the multiple public meetings held before and after the drafting of the basic document, some members of the commission did seek my views on some knotty questions involving plural democracy. The said members objected to the substitution of the expression political party by political organisation; their interpolations were rejected; and the denotation political organisation was retained.
The constitution cannot be amended mid-way; the business of improving the constitution and enriching it with supplementary documents, would have to wait for the election of the parliament of independents. Until such time that a national parliament replaces the transitional parliament of the PFDJ, the present constitution remains a dead letter. The constitution shall be regarded as being on ice until the election process commences, and a new parliament is elected. The constitution attains life only in the bosom of a national parliament. The main thrust of the programmatic proposal is: just as the transitional parliament gave legitimacy to the drafting and ratification of the constitution, so must it empower the electoral commission and the electoral court to initiate the process of parliamentary elections. That is the last major legislative function of the transitional parliament.
The theme of the programmatic proposals can be summarised as follows: it is unconstitutional for a single party state to conduct a sham 'democratic' election; the only constitutional exit lies in instituting a parliament of independents. The stipulation of two years residence (re: Salih's observation) is a requirement that the PFDJ cannot short-circuit. Without the residence stipulation the absentee candidates (much like absentee landlords of old) of the new party would be able to present themselves as candidates to the three level elections, on the argument of Adi or district origin alone.
Candidates must be elected on the basis of individual excellence as judged by the electorate of constituencies in which they reside. It is only in order to sumount the possible mushrooming of parochialism and modern absentee political landlordism that the principle of residence has been stipulated. However, Adi origin or citizenship suffices for candidates in the diaspora; for obvious reasons residence cannot apply to diaspora Eritreans. As regards the issue of double citizenship, and the legal hurdles that accompany it, we are advised to let it rest for the moment: if there is a will there is a way.
The PFDJ will do its level best to have as many of its cadres elected into the parliament. The second major obstacle the PFDJ needs to surmount is conflict of interest. Presently, the membership of the transitional parliament is composed mainly of ex-fighters who also have full-time government jobs. In a parliament of independents, the candidates have to choose between becoming members of parliament or occupants of lucrative jobs. Furthermore, the PDFJ can attempt to have control of the election commission and the election court only at the risk of abandoning democratic pretences, and the scorching political exposure that accompanies it. Finally, good behaviour can be expected from a political system that is wholly dependent upon the solidarity of its people.
THE PROGRAMMATIC PROPOSALS AND THE PDFJ:
Of the two discernible clusters of opinion in the power structure regarding the issue of parliamentary democracy, the PFDJ cluster has already been depicted; we need now to sketch the views of some members of the government of good intentions, who represent the second cluster of opinion. The second category straddles the area that lies between the need of establishing constitutional democracy and 'te'asasafinet'. The men of good intentions are fully cognisant of the negative consequences of delaying the implementation of the constitution; nevertheless, they are under pressure to find a quick solution to the political dead end that our country faces. As a way out, they present their good will arguments as follows:
"We advocated the early implementation of the constitution, so that some kind of institutional and democratic governance could be established; but nobody heeded our voices. The series of crisis with our neighbours did not help; the politics of brinkmanship did not permit us (the persons of good will) the opportunity to put our act together. It appears that the politics of surfing from crisis to crisis is intended to deny reasonable men of good will the opportunity to make a democratic stand. How can we stop the vicious circle? Perhaps it is possible to tinker with the existing constitution and the present parliament and come out with something useful.We can for example replace the president by another chairman, and by so doing project the image of an independent parliament. It may even be possible to transform the transitional parliament from a rubber stamp assembly into a standing legislative body with teeth; obviously, we cannot go as far as giving outright executive powers to the reinvented parliament, but we can, by a process of massive legislation, give it executive-like powers. If this dream package can be sold to our trusting masses, we might be able to negotiate our way out, unscathed, through the political minefield surrounding us. By this legerdemain it might even be possible to retain the president while denuding his power base, delay the democratic agenda, and negotiate as if we had the constitutional blessing of our people."
Despite the transparent sincerity of the advocates of this line of thinking, and their earnest search for a fire escape, a transitional parliament cannot be upgraded by a stroke of the pen, nor a constitution intended for the future parliament applied to the present one. A new chairman may be elected, the powers of the transitional parliament may be increased, but no amount of tinkering shall a national parliament make.
SOME ELECTORAL AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS:
Despite the strictures discussed above, it is within the sphere of competence of the transitional parliament to appoint the election commission and the election court. These two bodies must be selected carefully because it is though their hands that the Eritrean democratic baby shall be delivered. The two commissions must take the following make up of our country into consideration:
The geographic and demographic characteristics
The ethnic and linguistic features
The religious cultures
The balanced representation of the views of established political and ideological cultures, free from the heavy hand of the PDFJ.Further, the election committee needs to be invested with the powers:
1. To define the number of seats
2. To divide Eritrea into electoral constituencies
3. To elaborate the rules governing political campaigns and elections
4. To define the rules of fair play regarding equal time in the government owned mass media
5. To lay the ground rules for access to funds
6. To provide appropriate protection to candidatesThe election court shall have the following tasks:
1. To receive reports from the election commission and to ensure that its activities confirm with the rules of the democratic game.
2. To ensure that there is no undue pressure from the PFDJ
3. To interpret and judge cases covering the entire gamut of the election process
4. To define the rules regarding the qualification of candidacy
5. To ensure adherence to the principle of free and secret ballot
6. To lay down the procedures regarding the casting of votes, the protection of the ballot boxes, and the announcement of results of the electionAccording to the programmatic proposals, the establishment of political parties shall follow and not precede the parliamentary elections, as such, an in depth analysis would have to wait for the appropriate time. Nevertheless,a brief explanation is in order. The registration requirement is fairly straightforward: a prospective party presents its programme, a list of its leading bodies, the size of its membership, and a list of its candidates. A party has to register a minimum (given) percentage of the voting population to qualify as a national party; similarly, a party would have to secure a minimum (given) percentage in all the provinces. Let us say that registered parties are required to register a minimum of 2% in all the provinces, how many parties can fulfil this condition? Only the non-sectarian and democratic parties can emerge as national parties. By this method it is possible to build parties based on political programmes and ideologies across ethic and religious divides.
Quota democracy is an anti-democratic prescription; the self-evident equality of Eritrean motherhood and sisterhood with the male population, must not be an instrument of manipulation by potential dictators. The struggle for gender equality lies in the commitment of political parties and not in quota provisions. Representation for refugees and Eritreans in diaspora is a serious matter that has to be taken up by the election commission and the election court in the spirit of the principles delineated above.
MOVEMENT OF DEMOCRATS:
The Eritrean character that combines valour with sacrifice on the one hand, and submission to authority on the other, is difficult to reconcile. Leaving colonial history aside, and focusing only on the decade after independence, observers are perplexed by the fact that the Eritrean people should permit the PFDJ to ride roughshod over it. One explanation lies in the fact that it took the Eritrean people some time to discover that the liberators (EPLF) became the conquerors (PFDJ) of their own people. Another explanation can be found in the blind trust that was accorded by the Eritrea people to their heroic offspring. The explanations are many; the field is wide-open for poets to lament and researchers to document; yet, mention must be made of the proverbial Eritrean mouse for which way has always been made so that the oven remains intact. So much patience! So much arrogance!
The organising principle of the PDFJ is the 'wahio' or secret cell. The branch organisations of the PDFJ are fed with information that is intended strictly for internal consumption; if information is not aired openly, the danger of membership exposure to brain washing remains. Worse, defamation campaigns, misinformation, fear, and false hopes may be spread insidiously via the secret 'wahios'.
A movement of democrats precedes a democratic movement. Nobody organises a democrat; he organises himself! The democrat, who may be a member of the PFDJ, an other organisation, or is simply a dignified individual, acquires knowledge, exposes his intellect to democratic influences, and evolves an independent personality; in short, the democrat becomes his own political guru. The advanced democrat does not permit other gurus to lead him astray; at the same time he rejects isolation and seeks a life of intellectual communion with other democrats, in the form of a movement of democrats. Eritrean democrats are not against the PFDJ or any other organisation for that matter, because the possibility that they are packed with actual and potential democrats is great; no, the democrat directs his energies only against dictatorial political lines, ideologies, and their manipulators. The moment this stage of maturity is reached, it can be said that the condition for the birth of a democratic movement has come of age.
A DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT:
A movement differs from a party in the sense that it is not guided by a party programme but is kept together by a set of beliefs and its foremost articulators. In the case of Eritrea, these beliefs can be framed within three main political currents. These are: nationalism, democracy, and socialism. Nationalism is a constant in Eritrean politics; yet, the two remaining dimensions, namely, democracy and socialism affect it in such a way that it exhibits some interesting variations. Nationalism with less democratic content may concern itself less with national unity, and may tend to give more weight to organisational loyalty than national goals. In the situation described above, socialism is used as an instrument for internal discipline, organisational preponderance, and political legitimation.
Nationalism with more democratic content is concerned with national unity, individual liberties, and social solidarity. Nationalism with no democracy and a total commitment to socialism is a political relic that doe not merit discussion in these pages. The first variant derives its foreign policy from the perception that foreign policy is the maximisation of national interest. The game of maximisation is not a zero sum game; this line of thinking is known to have caused some of the most devastating wars in European history, permitting the emergence of one dominant power or a given balance of power. Nationalism with a strong dose of democracy bases its foreign policy on fine-tuning its own national interest to the interests of other nations. This type of foreign policy is sure to lead to co-operation and peace. It is on the basis of a fine balance between nationalism, democracy, and the right dose of social solidarity that a democratic movement can be created in Eritrea. When this stage is reached it is possible to call for a conference to evaluate the political situation in our country, launch a newspaper, and establish a listening post in Asmara.
Finally, it must be pointed out that the transitional nature of the Eritrea government, and its lack of constitutional blessing by the people, makes it incumbent upon its relevant organs to inform this noble and trusting people about the state of the nation, and upgrade the flow of information continuously.
Herui T. Bairu
Stockholm/24-08-00
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